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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2007, the world's leading private equity firms witnessed the
fall of the largest leveraged buyout boom since the junk-bond hay-day of
the late 1980s. Propelled by the sub-prime mortgage fallout and the
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broader credit crisis that followed,' nearly $45 billion worth of private
equity ("PE") sponsored buyouts were cancelled in the last six months
of the year.2 By 2008, annual PE deal volume had plummeted from $375
billion3 to $188.7 billion worth of announced transactions.4 In light of
the ongoing global recession, little doubt remains that "private equity's
kings have a less regal future"5 ahead of them. Deal cancellations-most
of them unilaterally initiated by PE acquirors-have been met with an
onslaught of acrimonious litigation from target corporations. Because
PE sponsored transactions are principally financed through the use of
debt secured by the assets of the target corporation, any constriction in
the credit markets makes closing a deal ever more difficult. Where no
liquidity exists in the secondary debt markets, leveraged buyouts simply
cannot get done.6 Thus, as PE firms faced the looming credit crunch of
summer 2007 many turned to escape provisions in their merger
agreements.
Indeed, in late 2007 and early 2008, nearly all of the largest deal
cancellations were predicated on one such provision commonly known
as the Material Adverse Change clause ("MAC").7 Simply put, the MAC
clause permits a buyer to back out of a merger contract if the target
corporation suffers a material adverse change in its core business or an
exogenous effect otherwise causes such a change.8 MAC clauses are
heavily negotiated yet often ambiguous in their scope. Some detail mul-
1. For a general discussion of the global credit crisis and its effect on private equity
financing, see Roben Farzad, Matthew Goldstein, David Henry, & Christopher Palmeri, Not So
Smart: In an Era of Easy Money, the Pros Forgot That the Party Can't Last Forever, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 3, 2007, at 30; Serena Ng & Tom Lauricella, Loan Slump May Crimp Buyout Deals, WALL
ST. J., July 13, 2007, at Cl; Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb Ticked, but
Few Heard, N.Y. TIMES, AUG. 19, 2007, at Al; see also infra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text.
2. Catherine Craig, PHH Collapse Takes Cancelled Buyouts to $45bn, FiN.NEws ONLINE
US, Jan. 2, 2008, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:6RM7aQ-M2joJ:www.efinancialnews.com
/assetmanagement/content/2349482568+%22PPH+Collapse+Takes+Cancelled+BuyoutsTMo+%24
45bn%22&cd= 1 &hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
3. Robert J. Samuelson, The Private Equity Boom, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at A19 ("In
2006, private equity firms bought 654 U.S. companies for a record $375 billion.").
4. Megan Davies, Private Equity Deals at Five-Year Low, REUTERS, Dec. 23, 2008, http://
uk.biz.yahoo.com/23122008/323/private-equity-deals-five-year-low.html.
5. A Boom in Bust-ups, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2007, at 79.
6. Francesco Guerrera & James Politi, Not Dancing Anymore: How the Music Stopped for
Buy-out Buccaneers, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at 9; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J.
de la Merced, Easy Credit Evaporates, and So Does the Market's Buyout Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2007, at CI (elaborating on the subsequent market effects of tightening credit).
7. Another common name for a MAC provision is a Material Adverse Effect clause
("MAE"). For simplicity's sake, this comment will adopt the use of the term MAC, although some
scholarship cited to employs the term MAE.
8. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACS: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions,
21 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 330, 330 (2005).
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tiple "carve-outs" or exceptions to what constitutes a MAC; others are
broad and contain no substantive elaboration on the meaning of the
words "material," "adverse," or "change."9 Consequently, while a MAC
often provides multiple starting points for an acquiror seeking to duck
out of a transaction, the clause has long frustrated courts and commenta-
tors, not to mention adversely situated parties to a transaction. Impor-
tantly, the current legal standard for interpreting a broadly drafted MAC
clause has limited application in the private equity context. In In re IBP
Shareholders Litigation,1" Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware
Chancery Court outlined and applied a definitional standard for large-
scale strategic mergers but cautioned that a different analysis would be
required for a short-term acquiror.1 1
This Comment attempts to provide the groundwork for a novel
approach to private equity MAC clause litigation-one that is more con-
sistent with the short-term financing objectives of the PE business
model. Given the fact that recent PE MAC litigation concerns whether
or not a MAC has actually occurred, it would seem, at first blush, that
the best preventative medicine would involve tighter contractual draft-
ing, including narrower MAC definitions with more comprehensive
carve-outs. This comment nonetheless argues that the particular contours
of the PE business model require 1) that PE firms continue to bargain for
broad MAC provisions; 2) that acquisition targets accept such broadly
drafted MAC terms; and 3) that courts be more sensitive to the impact
that broad economic disruptions can have on PE transactions.
Part II provides a general overview of the private equity industry
and compares the acquisition business model of a private equity firm
with that of a strategic acquiror. Part III presents an analysis of the MAC
clause, provides a theoretical basis for its inclusion in PE merger agree-
ments, and suggests that the inclusion of a broadly drafted MAC clause
is in the bests interests of both the PE acquiror and its target. Part IV
analyzes the In re IBP standard noted above and suggests an alternative
workable approach for litigation arising out of acrimonious PE transac-
tions. Finally, part V concludes and remarks on the future of the PE
business model in light of the analysis offered herein. It should be noted
that this comment does not attempt to summarize current or past MAC
clause jurisprudence. Indeed, the case law is too sparse and the opinions
9. Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 846, 848 (2002).
10. 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
11. Id. at 67 ("To a short-term speculator, the failure of a company to meet analysts' projected
earnings for a quarter could be highly material. Such a failure is less important to an acquiror who
seeks to purchase the company as part of a long-term strategy.").
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too divergent to do so.' 2 Rather, this comment suggests that courts con-
strue MAC provisions broadly by either expanding on the In re IBP
strategic/financial acquiror distinction or developing a wholly novel
approach to PE MAC litigation that takes account of general credit mar-
ket volatility. In doing so, the comment attempts to fill a theoretical void
in MAC clause jurisprudence.
11. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY
A. The Fund Structure
Because this comment addresses issues particular to a private
equity firm's investment strategy, it is not necessary to spend a lengthy
amount of time detailing the legal structure of the PE firms themselves.
Nevertheless, for the sake of the arguments made herein, a few key
points regarding the structure of a firm may prove helpful. First, the
typical PE firm is comprised of a series of pooled assets, or funds, typi-
cally organized into limited partnerships. The firm takes on the general
partnership interest while outside investors (i.e. high-net worth individu-
als, pension funds, endowments, banks and insurance companies) are
accorded the limited interests. The PE firm's management oversees the
fund's assets over the duration of the fund and makes all investment
decisions. A typical fund has a fixed duration of approximately ten years
and consists of two periods."3 During the investment period, which
spans the first half of the fund's life, the firm's management identifies
acquisition targets 4 and initiates venture capital investments and/or
leveraged buyouts. During the second half of the fund's life, known as
the holding period, management oversees the fund's investments, 5
ramping up portfolio companies' cash flows and reducing costs before
returning the portfolio companies to the public or reselling their assets to
a strategic acquiror or another PE fund.' 6
B. Historical Roots of the Business Model
The PE business model calls for two types of investment strategies,
12. See Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MiAMi Bus. L.
REV. 219, 241 (2002) ("Some of the case law in this area is scary. The decisions interpreting MAC
clauses are all over the lot, and some of the cases were quite clearly decided by judges that are not
familiar or comfortable with the finer points of M&A deals and acquisition agreements.").
13. Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge
Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BuFF. L. REV. 251, 260 (2006).
14. Target companies are referred to as "portfolio companies" after an acquisition has closed.
This Comment will make use of this moniker hereinafter when appropriate.
15. Bevilacqua, supra note 13, at 261.
16. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008).
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both of which are concentrated in illiquid securities: 1) the leveraged
buyout, whereby the PE acquisition vehicle takes a majority stake in a
target company and 2) the venture, or growth equity capital investment,
in which the PE firm's vehicle owns less than 50 percent of a portfolio's
company stock and does not otherwise have a controlling interest in the
company.' 7 Although a PE firm is not limited to these strategies," s the
leveraged buyout ("LBO") predominates and has historically been the
source of the industry's slightly nefarious reputation as a group of cor-
porate raiders.' 9
A leveraged buyout, in its simplest form, is an acquisition of a cor-
poration financed by a significant amount of debt secured by the assets
of the target corporation."0 Although many, if not most, PE-sponsored
LBO's are financed in part by the fund's equity, the majority of the
financing structure for the acquisition is comprised of debt from outside
sources.2' As one prominent financial commentator notes,
[t]he power of leverage is vast: if you invest ten dollars in an asset
and sell it a year later for twelve, you have earned twenty per cent. If
you invest one dollar, borrow nine, pay a dollar in interest on the debt
(an eleven-per-cent rate), and sell the asset for the same twelve dol-
lars, your return is one hundred per cent. 2
Thus, the prospect of enormous profit has encouraged private equity's
expansion at every point throughout the industry's short history.
Several additional factors contributed to the rapid rise of the LBO
17. See, e.g., John C. Mcllwraith, The Outlook for the Private Equity Market, 51 CASE W.
RES. L. Rav. 423, 424 (2001); Thomas Boulton, Kenneth Lehn & Steven Segal, The Rise of the
U.S. Private Equity Market, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES
AND POLICY CHANGES 144, 144 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., Brookings Inst. Press
2007).
18. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.'s investment in Harman International Industries
highlights a recent trend in alternative private equity investments and may also be indicative of a
growing tendency to avoid MAC litigation. The initial terms of the transaction called for KKR and
Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s PE arm, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, to sponsor an $8 billion
LBO of Harman. After KKR alleged that Harman had suffered a MAC, the parties agreed not to
litigate or revert to the reverse termination fee clause, which would have required KKR and
Goldman to pay Harman $225 million in order to walk away from the deal. Rather, KKR and
Goldman agreed to purchase $400 million of Harman's convertible debt securities. Christine
Idzelis & Lou Whiteman, Harman Settles with KKR, Goldman, THEDEAL.COM, Oct. 22, 2007 (on
file with author).
19. For an excellent account of the industry's predatory tactics and the LBO boom of the
1980's, see BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO (2003).
20. Tom Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts: The Ever Changing Landscape, 13
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 109, 109 (2001) ("These assets include such things as accounts receivable,
inventories, fixed assets, real estate, intangible assets, and the common stock of the company.").
21. Farzad et al., supra note 1, at 32 ("Buyout firms have generally fronted 30% of the equity
in recent deals, vs. just 15% two decades ago.").
22. James B. Stewart, The Birthday Party, NEW YORKER, Feb. 11, 2008, at 100.
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and the PE firm. In 1978, Congress reduced the capital gains tax from
49.5 percent to 28 percent and, shortly thereafter, the Labor Department
modified the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to
permit pension funds to invest a portion of their assets with PE firms.2 3
Private equity firms were also able to secure easy sources of financing
with the rise of the junk bond market in the early 1980s.24 At its peak,
the 1980s PE firm was raking in compounded annual rates of return of
60 to 100 percent.2 5 As it often does, however, success soon begot ava-
rice, and PE firms began adopting arguably reckless and predatory
investment techniques.26 After the 1987 market crash, the infamous Sav-
ings and Loan scandals, and the subsequent tightening of the credit mar-
kets, the LBO boom slowed considerably, and many PE firms were
forced to revise their acquisition strategies and more precisely define the
economic parameters of potential targets.27
C. Contemporary Trends in the Business Model
In recent years, PE-sponsored LBOs have targeted
under-performing companies with high growth potential and compara-
tively low margins. Targets often suffer from low productivity and high
overhead, and require substantial reorganization and asset recapitaliza-
tion in the post-acquisition period.28 Moreover, because profit falls and
debt levels typically soar shortly after the buyout closes-with gross
debt often five to eight times greater than earnings before interest and
tax-management is forced to make drastic structural changes in order
to fulfill the concurrent tasks of servicing the company's debt and
improving operations. Substantial employment cuts are not uncommon,
especially in instances where "[d]uplication of back office functions can
23. Ablum & Burgis, supra note 20, at 112.
24. Id. at 113. The moniker "junk" refers to the ratings given to the debt. The term derives
from the distressed assets that the debt is secured upon-i.e. a target company's cash flows. See
also JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (Touchstone, 1992) (recounting the rise and fall of the
1980s junk bond market and its key players, Michael Miliken and Ivan Boesky).
25. Boulton et al., supra note 17, at 144.
26. Many of America's largest corporations were potential targets for hostile and friendly
takeovers during this time. KKR's $25 billion buyout of RJR Nabisco became a symbol of the
rash investment strategies employed by the PE industry. While the buyout was the largest of its
kind (a statistic that remained in place for many years, see infra note 108), the investment proved
disastrous for KKR, who later sold the company at a loss. See generally BURROUGH & HELYAR,
supra note 19.
27. Ablum & Burgis, supra note 20, at 121, 124 ("[t]he setting of parameters and rating and
evaluating perspective transactions is one of the current building blocks that was not as important
in the 1970s or early 1980s."); see also Boulton, et al., supra note 17, at 146 (noting that in the
wake of the market reorganization of the early 1990s "higher prices, lower leverage ratios, and
lower expected returns necessitated a back-to-basics approach for most LBO practitioners.").
28. Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Private Equity Boom: Causes and Policy Issues, OECD
FIN. MARKET TRENDS, May, 2007 at 68-69; Boulton et al., supra note 17, at 153.
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be removed."29
Yet, despite the radical changes that the PE firm implements, once
the portfolio company has met the economic thresholds required by the
PE fund, the fund sells its investment. Thus, cost-reductions are inher-
ently short-sighted. The focus for a PE parent is to maximize its fund's
exit profit. Although somewhat renegade in nature, the modem PE busi-
ness model proved highly lucrative for fund investors. Data suggests that
at the height of the buyout boom, contemporary PE funds "substantially
outperform[ed] benchmark indexes such as the S&P 500." 03
D. Comparison to the Strategic Acquisition Business Model
The strategic acquisition model stands in stark contrast to the LBO
investment strategies noted above. 31 First, strategic acquisitions are
chiefly financed through the use of equity as opposed to debt. Stock-for-
stock mergers,32 short form statutory mergers,33 and other combinations
common in strategic deals all involve a substantial apportionment of the
acquiring company's equity.34 In large public mergers, equity is consid-
ered the most efficient and cheapest financing structure. As Professor
James A. Fanto has noted, "[u]sing stock as merger consideration avoids
the significant borrowing costs that accompany a cash acquisition of an
enormous firm, for few firms generate enough cash to conduct a mega-
acquisition. ' 35 Debt is the exception rather than the rule.36
A second, and perhaps most important, difference between the stra-
29. Blundell-Wignall, supra note 28, at 64, 66.
30. Id. at 69. Fund performance has also been bolstered by a tax code provision allowing
limited partnership dividends to be taxed as capital gains. I.R.C. § 702(b) (West 2003). As a
result, fund managers have jumped at the opportunity to extract even more cash from their
portfolio companies, sometimes even financing the dividends with additional debt. "From 1997 to
2002, loan volume for funding such dividend recapitalizations averaged less than $2 billion per
annum. From 2004 through the first quarter of 2006, these dividend recaps funded with loans were
averaging $4.7 billion per quarter." Boulton, et al., supra note 17 at 148 (emphasis in original).
For an excellent critique of the tax implications for private equity funds under the current tax
regime, see Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
31. See Lou R. Kling, Eileen Nugent Simon & Michael Goldman, Summary of Acquisition
Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 779, 780 (1997).
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (2008).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 254 (2008).
34. James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing
Mega-Mergers, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 249, 266 (2001) ("Many-and the most prominent-of these
enormous business combinations are characterized by their participants as 'strategic' 'mergers of
equals' and are conducted through a stock-for-stock merger."); see also Alfred Rappaport & Mark
L. Sirower, Stock or Cash? The Trade-Offs for Buyers and Sellers in Mergers and Acquisitions,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 147.
35. Fanto, supra note 34, at 267-68.
36. Id. at 268.
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tegic acquiror and the PE acquiror concerns the operational strategies
that each acquiror implements in the post-acquisition period. While a PE
acquiror may engage in a stringent cost reduction plan and a fire sale of
the target's dispensable assets, a strategic acquiror generally implements
a cumulative investment strategy to encourage its subsidiary to continue
to expand over the long term. Professor Roberta Romano has explained
the latter strategy on the basis of the strategic acquiror's motivation to
achieve economic synergies.37 Economic synergies result when an
acquiror can combine its own unique resources with those of the target.
Often, combined resources can significantly increase production effi-
ciency in the post combination period. This result is even more likely
when both the target and the acquiror are participants in the same indus-
try.38 Another explanation for large-scale public mergers considers the
combined firm's potential market power. Mergers motivated by market
control are also more likely to involve participants in a single industry.
Notwithstanding antitrust concerns, a merged firm is more competitive
vis-A-vis its industry counterparts.39
Third, the investment time frame for strategic acquirors is much
more long-term compared to the four to six-year holding period common
in most PE acquisitions."n While PE portfolio companies are often
"pumped and dumped," strategic targets become part and parcel of an
operational strategy that is usually indefinite in temporal scope.
E. The fall of the sub-prime mortgage market and
resurgence of the MAC
The most recent PE boom arguably ended with the 2007 sub-prime
mortgage fallout.4" Many of the Wall Street investment banks that
finance PE-sponsored LBO's held enormous long positions in sub-prime
mortgage debt or other assets secured by other exceptionally risky loans.
Much of this debt was issued between 2002 and 2005, when interest
37. Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 119, 125 (1992).
38. Id. at 127 (citing Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Rovert W. Vishny, Do Managerial
Motives Drive Bad Acquisitions, 45 J. FIN. 31 (1990)). While the converse does not necessarily
follow, it seems apparent from this conclusion that acquisition parties that are involved in
completely divergent industries, such as the parties in a PE sponsored LBO, would be motivated
by factors other than economic synergies. PE firms are not in the business of contributing tangible
production resources to their portfolio companies.
39. Id. at 142.
40. See, e.g., A Boom in Bust-ups, supra note 5, at 80 (referring to,David Rubenstein's, The
Carlyle Group's Chairman, comment that even at the long range, average holding periods will
likely only increase to four to six years in the wake of the credit crisis).
41. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, The Easy Trillions are Gone, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 2007, at 32;
see also sources cited supra note 1.
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rates were comparatively low and the housing market was in the throes
of a glut. A large portion of the sub-prime mortgages contained teaser
provisions wherein the debt would shift from fixed-rate to adjustable
interest after two to three years. Despite the certainty of future higher
rates, homeowners remained confident that they would be able to refi-
nance before the adjustable-rate provisions vested. Businesses also
began to take cheap money for granted and borrowed exorbitantly. "A
key measure of leverage, a company's total debt divided by operating
earnings, skyrocketed from 4.7 in 2004 to 7.0 in the second quarter of
2007."42
Alas, the confidence was short lived. In late 2006 and early 2007, a
substantial portion of the adjustable-rate provisions vested at the same
time, and a wave of foreclosures followed. 43 The value of the sub-prime
debt collapsed, and the impact on overall credit liquidity was substantial.
In the broader economy, the outlook had gone from bad to worse. With
the profits to interest ratio falling from 3.4 to 1.8 from 2004 to 2007, 4 4
companies suddenly found themselves unable to service their long-term
debt obligations.
Secondary debt investors fled to the safety of treasury bonds,
avoiding the riskier products that the investment banks were desperately
trying to take off of their books. Thus, as the global credit markets tight-
ened, PE acquirors found it increasingly difficult to obtain the necessary
leveraged financing to close deals. 4' Their banking partners simply
42. Farzad et al., supra note 1, at 32.
43. For an interesting recount of several individual homeowners who faced the consequences
of these mortgages, see Steve Lohr, Loan by Loan, the Making of a Credit Squeeze, N.Y. TIMES,
August 19, 2007, at B1.
44. Farzad et al., supra note 1, at 32.
45. Banks fled PE financing commitments in droves. Consider, for example, the $1.7 billion
buyout of PHH Corporation by private equity powerhouse, The Blackstone Group. In January
2008, J.P. Morgan and Lehman Brothers refused to fund the deal, citing concerns about PHH's
collateral. Dana Cimilluca & David Enrich, Deal-Making Ties Unravel-Underwriters Retreating
from Backing Buyouts; PHH's Fate an Example, WALL ST. J., September 18, 2007, at Cl; see
also Karen Donovan, As Some Buyouts Falter, New Tactics Aim to Lock in Deals, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2008, at C6.
Apollo Management LP was also embroiled in a long-running dispute with its lenders over
the failed buyout of Utah chemical-producer, Huntsman Corporation. The $10.6 billion deal,
originally executed in the first half of 2007, derailed when Apollo sued Huntsman to terminate. In
its suit, Apollo argued that merging Huntsman with Apollo's other portfolio company, Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, would render the combined entity insolvent. Michael J. de la Merced,
Chemical Maker Files Suit to Block Its $10.6 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C4.
Vice Chancellor Lamb of the Delaware Chancery court rejected nearly all of Apollo's claims
and ordered the PE fund to complete the transaction. See Hexion Specialty Chems. Inc. v.
Huntsman Corp., No. 3841-VCL, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 134 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2008). In turn,
Apollo then sued its lending partners, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank, after the banks refused to
issue the debt needed to fund the buyout. Peter Lattman, Apollo's Hexion Sues Banks Over
Funding on Huntsman, WALL ST. J., October 30, 2008, at C3. Eventually, Apollo, Huntsman, and
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could not sell bonds secured by the assets of distressed PE acquisition
targets.46 Furthermore, the debt packages that were available to PE
acquirors contained higher interest rate provisions in order to account for
the risk premium that secondary investors required.47
In turn, many of the largest PE deals of 2007 began to unravel. PE
acquirors turned to escape-provisions in their merger agreements in
order to sidestep obligations. At center stage in this story were material
adverse change clauses,48 and the most illustrative case was the failed
$25 billion leveraged buyout of student lending house Sallie Mae.
In September of 2007, the PE firm J.C. Flowers attempted to walk
away from its proposed acquisition of Sallie Mae after initially bidding
$60 per share. The firm argued that Sallie Mae had suffered two material
adverse changes during the executory period. First, the firm claimed that
Federal student-lending legislation, which passed in September of 2007
and reduced federal subsidies to student-lenders, would put an imper-
missible damper on the target's potential earnings. Second, the firm
claimed that general economic conditions had changed in a way as to
the banks agreed to revise the transaction on mutually acceptable terms. Apollo invested $250
million with Huntsman in exchange for ten-year convertible 7% notes, the banks financed a $325
million reverse termination fee, and Apollo paid an additional $425 million, "some or all of which
may be recovered" by the PE firm. Peter Lattman, Apollo, Huntsman Reach Amicable Split, WALL
ST. J., December 15, 2008, at Cl. For a discussion of similar negotiated settlements, see notes 16
and 51 and accompanying text.
46. So called "toxic assets" were at the heart of the 2008 global financial meltdown that
brought down storied investment banks such as Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman
Brothers. See, e.g.,Robin Sidel, Greg Ip, Michael M. Phillips & Kate Kelly, The Week That Shook
Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear Steams, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2008, at Al; Susanne
Craig, Jeffrey McCracken, Aaron Lecchetti & Kate Kelly, The Weekend That Wall Street Died,
WALL ST. J., December 29, 2008, at Al.
47. Emily Thornton, Private Equity's White Knuckle Deal, Bus. WK., Sept. 17, 2007, at 46;
see also supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
48. See generally, Jack Welch & Suzy Welch, Behind all Those Undone Deals, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 17, 2007, at 84. A MAC provision was the focal point of the cancellation of Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co.'s $8 billion acquisition of Harman International Industries. Michael J. de la
Merced, Wary Buyers May Scuttle Two Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at C]; Who's Winning
in Deal Negotiations?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK.COM, Oct. 10, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.
com/2007/10/10/whats-in-a-mac/. A MAC clause also figured tangentially in Cerberus Capital
Management's fight to walk away from its $7 billion leveraged buyout of United Rentals.
Francesco Guerrera, Banks Lose their Enthusiasm for 'Gekko' Deals, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, at
31.
Investors have also begun litigating other contractual provisions similar to MACs. In an
attempt to sidestep a $40 million construction loan that he personally guaranteed, prominent real-
estate mogul Donald Trump has gone so far as to declare the global economic downturn an "act of
God" pursuant to aforce majeure clause. Floyd Norris, Trump Sees Act of God in Recession, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008 at B I. Compared to MACs, Force Majeure clauses are characteristically
more extreme in the types of contingencies they cover, but the relative similarity of the two
clauses makes the Trump case a noteworthy one for the purposes of this comment. See generally
P.J.M. Declercq, Modem Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of
Commercial Impracticability, 15 J. L. & COM. 213 (1995).
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make the deal disadvantageous for both parties.4 9 J.C. Flowers sought
the protection afforded by the MAC clause notwithstanding a provision
in the merger agreement that would have allowed the buyout firm to
walk away from the deal upon the payment of a $900 million reverse
termination fee. 50 The negotiations quickly turned acrimonious. On
October 8, 2007, Sallie Mae sued J.C. Flowers in the Delaware Chan-
cery Court, seeking injunctive relief to force the PE firm to close its
buyout.5" A trial was set before Vice Chancellor Leo Strine for Decem-
ber 2008, but the parties settled in late January.52 Under the terms of the
settlement, J.C. Flowers and the consortium of banks that were slated to
provide debt financing for the buyout agreed to refinance a portion of
Sallie Mae's outstanding debt with a $30 billion line of credit.53
III. THE MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSE
A. Definitions
The purpose of the MAC clause is to insure against the risk of
unforeseen occurrences during the executory period of a merger or
acquisition. In its most basic form, the typical MAC provides as follows:
Since the date of the Balance Sheet, there has not been any material
adverse change in the business, operations, properties, prospects,
assets, or condition of [the] Acquired company, and no event has
occurred or circumstance exists that may result in such a material
adverse change.54
Should the target company suffer any of the conditional changes noted
in the MAC, the acquiror has the right to unilaterally cancel its obliga-
tion to purchase the target's stock.
The scope of protection that the MAC clause provides is a product
of lengthy negotiation between the parties. The model MAC clause is
49. Dennis K. Berman, Buyout Group Balks at Sallie Mae, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, at
A3.
50. Id. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of reverse
termination fees.
51. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Sallie Mae Sues to Force a Buyout, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 9, 2007 at CI.
52. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Sallie Mae Settles Suit Over Buyout that
Fizzled, N.Y.TimEs, Jan. 28, 2008, at C1. Notably, Vice Chancellor Strine authored the opinion in
In re IBP Shareholders Litigation, the seminal case discussing interpretation of a MAC clause.
Unfortunately, because of the recent Sallie Mae settlement, the possibility that the Court (and
Strine) will revisit the In re IBP standard for the private acquisition context in the near future is
slight.
53. Id. The terms of the negotiated settlement are similar to those agreed to by Harman
Industries and KKR. See supra note 17.
54. Richard E. Climan, Doing Deals 2002: Understanding the Nuts & Bolts of Transactional
Practice in an Uncertain Market, 1295 P.L.I. CoRP,. LAW AND PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 589, 626
(2002).
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sometimes supplemented by a list of "carve-outs" or exceptions to what
constitutes a material adverse change. Common carve-outs include: 1)
adverse changes affecting the global economy, the U.S. economy, the
regional economy, or the seller's industry; 2) changes in applicable laws,
rules, or regulations; 3) deal-related litigation-in particular, litigation
for alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the target company's board; 4)
change or effect caused by announcement of the deal itself; and 5) the
results of actions taken by the seller at the acquiror's request.5 5 The
broader the scope of the MAC and the fewer the carve-outs, the more
leeway an acquiror has to walk away from the deal before committing
the required funds; hence an acquiror's inclination to broaden carve-outs
and a target's inclination to do the opposite.56
The scope of protection afforded by the MAC clause is also illus-
trative and functionally tied to the price the acquiror agrees to pay for
the target's stock. Since the seller takes on the primary risk of breaching
the conditions enumerated in the MAC, the seller is in the best position
to bargain for a price that accurately reflects the target's value. This is so
"because without a MAC provision, the buyer would have an incentive
to discount the price of the seller's assets to reflect the risk of the seller
experiencing a MAC. 57
B. Explanations for the emergence of the MAC clause in
modem merger agreements
Several theories have attempted to explain the emergence of the
MAC clause in modem M&A agreements. In doing so, these theories
have defined the MAC as a byproduct of complex negotiation rather
than as a simple insurance policy against interim risk. One theory sug-
gests that the MAC clause arose as an exogenous incentive, indirectly
encouraging target corporations to augment their existing businesses
during the executory period. This theory assumes that because the MAC
clause demands preservation of the financial status quo, the target may
inadvertently end up bolstering its economic position during the interim
in order to insure the financial viability that the acquiror seeks ex post
55. Galil, supra note 9, at 848-49. This list is by no means exhaustive nor representative of a
complete set of carve-outs that would be included in a merger agreement. Furthermore, the list is
indicative of carve-outs common to public mergers. Private M&A agreements may adopt a
considerably different set of carve-outs, or none at all.
56. Id. at 849; see also Jeffrey Thomas Cicarella, Wake of Death: How the Current MAC
Standard Circumvents the Purpose of the MAC Clause, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423, 426 (2007)
("Since one of the purposes of the MAC clause is to shift risk, an obvious tension results between
the acquirer and the target over the specificity of the language.").
57. Jonathan M. Grech, "Opting Out": Defining the Material Adverse Change Clause in a
Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L. J. 1483, 1486 (2003).
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acquisition.58
Another theory describing the emergence of the MAC clause
derives from a series of late 1980s and early 1990s Delaware cases
requiring targets to accept the highest per-share value offered by com-
peting acquirors.5 9 Under the Symmetry Theory, a competitive bid pro-
cess effectively gives the target a definitive (and valuable) right to sell,
"transform[ing] the merger agreement into a put option."6 Thus, the
MAC clause serves either 1) to compensate the acquiror in exchange for
the strategic bargaining position the target was able to obtain via a com-
petitive bidding process; 61 or 2) as a means implemented by the target to
encourage a more competitive and lucrative bidding process than would
occur otherwise.
Other theories go further by specifically explaining the particular
emergence of the MAC clause in PE transactions. These theories tie the
development of the MAC clause to the development of other clauses in
the typical PE merger agreement.62 Historically, merger provisions such
as representations and warranties have served to shift risk between
targets and PE acquirors. Thus, some have suggested that the MAC
clause arose as a means to ferret out whatever surplus risk remained
after negotiations on these other provisions had been exhausted. A his-
torical overview of drafting trends helps to illustrate this phenomenon.
Prior to several recent deals, LBO agreements contained financing
conditions that provided for a PE firm's pre-closing exit in the event the
firm was unable to obtain the leveraged loans necessary to complete the
transaction.63 It was discovered, however, that the financing condition
put the PE firm at a disadvantage vis-A-vis a strategic acquiror compet-
ing for the same target, and in 2005, parties began replacing financing
conditions with reverse termination fees. 6
58. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 336.
59. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
("Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's shareholder's the best price
available for their equity."); Mills Acquisition Company v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280
(Del. 1989) ("Fair price, in the context of an auction for corporate control, mandates that directors
commit themselves, inexorably, to obtaining the highest value reasonably available to the
shareholders under all the circumstances.") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Paramount
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1993) ("the directors' obligation [is]
to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders").
60. Cicarella, supra note 56, at 428.
61. Id.
62. While these theories may be more relevant to this Comment's scope, they pose analytical
problems when examining the MAC in a market plagued by tight-credit.
63. Paul S. Bird & Jonathan E. Levitsky, Deals Redefined, THEDEAL.COM, Dec. 18, 2007 (on
file with author).
64. See, e.g., Bryce Klempner et al., Case Study: Selling Neiman Marcus, 12 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 235, 249-50 (2007).
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Reverse termination fees allow a PE firm to exit a transaction by
paying the target a fixed amount of one to three percent of the total
transaction value.65 While the reverse termination fee does provide some
conciliatory benefit to a PE firm engaged in transaction without a
financing condition, the PE firm is nonetheless required to take on a
degree of risk-namely the payment of tens of millions of dollars-in a
section of the merger agreement where, historically, the PE firm bore no
risk at all.66 In turn, PE acquirors sought a way to apportion the interim
risk that the reverse termination fee imputed and insure that the PE
firm's liability on a deal gone awry would be limited to the fee alone. As
such, PE merger agreements began to include express waivers of a tar-
get's right to specific performance. "By bargaining for a waiver of the
seller's right to specific performance under any circumstances . .
together with a cap on liability for monetary damages, private equity
buyers substantially enhanced their leverage in the event of an adverse
change in the leveraged finance market .... ,,67 Thus, the argument
contends, it is unsurprising that the increase of MAC carve-outs in
merger agreements coincided with the emergence of the specific per-
formance waiver. Buyers were left with little choice but to level the
playing field by defining more precisely (and thus limiting) the instances
that would give rise to a material adverse change.
C. Advantages of a broadly drafted MAC clause
While competing theories attempt to explain the emergence of the
narrowly drafted MAC clause in PE merger agreements, this Comment
suggests that PE firms and targets will and should seek broader MAC
provisions in the aftermath of the 2007 credit crisis. That is to say, MAC
clauses should be drafted to allow for deal cancellations in a highly vola-
tile secondary debt market. The need for a broadly drafted MAC derives
from two aspects of modern PE transactions: 1) the contractual structure
and 2) the financing structure. Both aspects are discussed in turn.
1. CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE
Broadly drafted MAC clauses offer a set of mutual advantages to
targets and acquirors. First, where parties are unable to agree to certain
terms in pre-executory negotiations, a certain level of contractual ambi-
guity helps to move a transaction along. 68 As Judge Richard A. Posner
65. See id. at 246.
66. See id. at at 242 (describing how a reverse termination fee in the 2005 leveraged buyout
of Neiman Marcus "shifted deal risk to the buyers, even in areas traditionally the responsibility of
the sellers.").
67. Bird & Levitsky, supra note 63.
68. The courts agree. In the seminal case discussing MAC clause interpretation, In re IBP
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notes, "the parties may be unable to agree on certain points yet be con-
tent to take their chances on being able to resolve them, with or without
judicial intervention, should the need arise."69 Indeed, the resolutions of
the failed Harman Industries7" and Sallie Mae7" buyouts add credence to
this notion. Facing the threat of litigation over broadly drafted MAC
clauses, the parties to both deals agreed to alternative financing struc-
tures in lieu of buyouts.
Conversely, narrowly drafted MAC clauses carry a risk that courts
will interpret the contract in a way that neither party initially intended.
Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,7 a narrow
carve out may be held to supplant another broadly drawn provision.
Thus, "if an event occurs that does not quite fall under the sub-clause's
language, the broader provision might be held also not to apply."73
Second, recent trends in the PE industry suggest that targets may be
able to obtain more lucrative per-share offers from acquirors where pro-
posed merger agreements contain broadly drafted MACs. "Club deals,"
or private equity transactions involving multi-firm bidding consortia,
became a common feature of the PE landscape in the 2006-2007 buyout
boom. In these transactions, competing consortia bid on target compa-
nies, who, by virtue of their sheer size, could not be bought out by a
single PE acquiror acting alone. 74 The previously discussed Symmetry
Theory has particular relevance in a club-deal market. As Professors
Gilson and Schwartz note, "[a] seller functioning in this economic and
legal environment has an incentive to offer a MAC to potential buyers.
A broadly drafted MAC would increase a buyer's expected gain from an
acquisition, and this would increase the likelihood that the seller would
receive bids."75
Shareholders Litigation,, Vice Chancellor Strine hesitated to "encourage the negotiation of
extremely detailed 'MAC' clauses with numerous carve-outs or qualifiers. An approach that reads
broad clauses as addressing fundamental events that would materially affect the value of a target
to a reasonable acquiror eliminates the need for drafting of that sort." 789 A.2d. at 68 n.155.
69. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1581, 1583 (2005).
70. See supra note 18.
71. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
72. "A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004).
73. Galil, supra note 9 at 857.
74. For background on the advent of the club deal, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gluttons on Wall
Street: Is $10 Billion Big Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 9, 2005, at § 3, p. 5. The club deal's
relevance has arguably decreased in the wake of the 2007 credit crunch. However, club deals
continue to be common in large LBOs and often involve three or more PE shops bidding together.
See David Carey & Vipal Monga, The Incredible Shrinking Club Deal, THEDEAL.COM, Mar. 12.,
2007 (on file with author); John Vasily & Kevin Schmidt, Mixed Clubbing, THEDEAL.COM, Dec.
14, 2007 (on file with author)..
75. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 336. Although Gilson and Schwartz would prefer to
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2. FINANCING STRUCTURE
Traditional scholarship examining the emergence of MAC carve-
outs fails to account for the substantial loan risk that shifts from PE
acquiror to target after a deal has closed. For example, Professors Gilson
and Schwartz attempt to explain an increase in carve-outs, or as they
say, a shift in MAC formulation "from the general to the particular," by
suggesting that broad MAC clauses impute an "increase in exogenous
and undiversifiable risk that would be inefficiently borne by the [target]
were merger agreements not to allocate the risk to buyers" during the
executory period.76 However, this theory has limited application in the
case of a private equity sponsored acquisition. In PE deals, a significant
amount of exogenous risk-more risk than the target would bear if the
deal were not consummated-transfers to the target corporation only
upon the closing of the transaction.
Thus, PE targets-not acquirors-can and should bear deal cancel-
lation risk during the executory period. Empirical surveys of target com-
panies' capital management capabilities confirm this fact. According to
Thomas Boulton, typical target firms "approximately 1.8 percentage
points more working capital per dollar of sales than does the average
industry peer in the year before the announcement of the target firm
going private. The data suggest that target companies are therefore
presumptively inclined to divert cash reserves and other assets away
from debt service obligations before the companies are ever even
acquired, putting them at even greater risk for post-acquisition default in
a high-interest market. 8 Furthermore, once acquired, high-interest debt-
service obligations place additional burdens on management's ability to
finance the portfolio company's day-to-day operations.79 In conse-
conceptualize the MAC as an incentive for the target to develop its core business prior to closing,
see id. at 357 ("The buyer's exit right encourages the seller to take actions that would protect and
possibly enhance the value the new company is expected to have."), they imply that the
explanation given herein may have relevance in a market riddled with competitive acquisition
bids.
76. Id. at 333.
77. Boulton et al, supra note 17, at 154-55. Boulton and his co-researchers define the
operative variable, working capital management as "accounts receivable plus inventory minus
accounts payable, all divided by net sales." Id. at 153 n.17.
78. Because PE fund managers are capable of financing dividends to be issued to the fund on
behalf of a portfolio company, there is additional cause for concern that target companies continue
to engage in risky capital management practices after a buyout has closed. If target managers have
trouble limiting capital expenditures before going private, one need not speculate too much as to
the additional burden that a PE fund management's tendency to finance these dividends has on
total assets post-acquisition. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
79. Michelle M. Jochner, The Detrimental Effects of Hostile Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts,
and Excessive Debt on the Airline Industry, 19 TRAr sP. L.J. 219, 222 (1990) ("[T]he constant
threat of not being able to meet the debt payments and the threat of ultimate bankruptcy, severely
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quence, a previously competitive company may find its market position
undercut by its financing requirements. 80
Therefore, a broadly drafted MAC provision offers a two-fold pro-
tection scheme: first, during the executory period, the PE acquiror has
greater leeway in walking away from a target that cannot afford to ser-
vice its debt obligations and whose future value to the sponsor fund
(upon the PE firm's exit) is diminished; and second, the target is off the
hook from having to service the debt and can therefore reduce the risks
of shortcomings in future earnings and potential exposure to creditors.
A recent survey conducted by a group of PE practitioners implies
that parties on both sides of a PE transaction are beginning to recognize
the potential pitfalls of including carve-outs for debt-market downturns
in MAC clauses. For example, while 83 percent of the 413 announced
M&A transactions between June 1, 2006 and May 31, 2007 contained
carve-outs for general economic changes, only 17 percent of those same
deals provided carve-outs for interest rate fluctuations. 8' This suggests
that while targets may choose to insure against general economic risk,
they understand that volatility in the debt markets presents a substantial
amount of un-diversifiable risk for portfolio companies in the post-
acquisition period of a deal. The same data guide the practitioners' pre-
dictions about the future of PE merger agreement drafting. They "expect
that the overheated pro-seller market will cool off significantly as a
result of less leverage being available to private equity buyers. Accord-
ingly, [they] would expect deal terms (including the MAC provision) to
circumscribes management's freedom. These considerations may force management to pull back
from investment plans because the company's cash flow is instead largely dedicated to the
suppliers of capital."). Jochner goes on to take a more pessimistic stance than the one espoused in
this Comment. Instead of limiting the reach of adverse economic effects of debt-laden portfolio
companies to the companies themselves, she goes further by suggesting that highly leveraged
portfolio companies affect the economy on a macro scale by misallocating resources:
In essence, changing the compan's capital structure from one laden heavily with
equity to one laden with debt effectively transfers control over the company's cash
flow from managers to creditors. This is an inefficient allocation of society's scarce
capital resources. The service of needless debt, brought about solely because of
takeover speculation and individual greed, surely is not the optimum use of
society's capital. These transactions serve merely to rearrange capital; they do not
create capital.
Id.
80. Id. at 223. Jochner's comments are particularly relevant considering the similarity
between the economic conditions that the private equity industry faced at the time of her writing
and those the industry faces today.
81. Sixth Annual MAC Survey: A Nixon Peabody Study of Current Negotiation Trends of
Material Adverse Change Clauses in M&A Transactions, 1, 5, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://
www.nixonpeabody.com/linked-media/publications/MAC-survey-2007.pdf. While the Nixon
Peabody study does not subdivide its data into private equity and strategic acquisitions, the stark
contrast between the number of MAC carve outs for general financial seems indicative of a
general wariness to volatility in the credit markets.
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become more buyer-friendly."82
In the end, a broadly drawn MAC clause serves as an insurance
policy against a deal that is in neither the acquiror's nor the target's
interests. As one prominent deal lawyer notes, "[o]ne of the important
benefits that that economy gets from ... private equity investors ... is
not just from their decisions to back certain projects, but also from their
decisions not to back certain projects .... This has the effect of conserv-
ing capital for the most promising projects. 83 The capital that PE spon-
sors invest in portfolio companies is best allocated when portfolio
management can use the funds to add value at the operational level of
the business. When portfolio companies divert investment capital away
from operations and toward debt servicing obligations, both the portfolio
company and the PE parent suffer diminished future returns. A broadly
drafted MAC clause that accounts for volatility in the secondary debt
markets during the executory period protects against poor future returns
and insures that both parties to a transaction are benefited at every stage
of the deal.84
IV. FASHIONING A NEW STANDARD
A. In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
Currently, the seminal case adopting a standard for MAC clause
interpretation is In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.85 In re IBP
involved a merger between the largest beef provider in the United States,
Tyson Foods, and the second-largest pork distributor, IBP, Inc. 86 During
the executory period both companies suffered the effects of a downturn
in the livestock industry,87 and IBP wrote down a $60.4 million loss due
to the poor performance of one its subsidiaries. 8 In March of 2001,
Tyson moved to terminate the transaction and filed suit in Arkansas.89
IBP then countered by seeking injunctive relief in the Delaware Chan-
cery Court to enforce the terms of the proposed merger.9°
In its brief, Tyson argued that IBP had suffered a material adverse
82. Id. at 2.
83. William H. Coquillette, Comment: Private Equity, Capitalism, and Efficiency, 51 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 479, 481 (2001).
84. See Posner, supra note 69, at 1582 ("The main purpose of contracts is to enable
performance to unfold over time without either party being at the mercy of the other .
85. 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 22.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id. at 50-51.
90. Id. at 51.
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effect.9 ' The relevant MAC clause, however, contained no carve-outs for
a general downturn in the economy.92 As such, Vice Chancellor Strine
ordered Tyson to specifically perform its obligations, and in doing so,
held that a broadly drafted MAC clause in a merger agreement between
two public corporations "is best read as a backstop protecting the
acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events that substantially
threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a durationally-
significant manner. ' '93 The Court thus adopted a novel approach to the
issue of materiality in the context of MAC clauses. The Court's holding
proved instructive in a number of subsequent cases and remains the prin-
ciple standard upon which many MAC cases are decided.94
B. The strategic acquiror / short-term speculator distinction and its
application to the private equity industry
Despite its continuing validity, In re IBP's application is more lim-
ited than its progeny might suggest. "Because each acquisition poten-
tially has a different rationale, the value of the 'reasonable acquiror'
91. Id. at 52.
92. Id. at 65-66 ("On its face, [the MAC provision] is a capacious clause that puts IBP at risk
for a variety of uncontrollable factors that might materially affect its overall business or results of
operation as a whole. Although many merger contracts contain specific exclusions from MAE
clauses that cover declines in the overall economy or the relevant industry sector, or adverse
weather or market conditions, [the instant clause] is unqualified by such express exclusions.").
The MAC clause employed by the parties is included herein:
Except as set forth in [a list of carve-outs for certain financial liabilities and
administrative injunctions], there are no liabilities of the Company of any
Subsidiary of any kind whatsoever, whether accrued, contingent, absolute,
determined, determinable or otherwise, and there is no existing condition, situation
or set of circumstances which could reasonably be expected to result in such a
liability, other than: (a) liabilities disclosed or provided for in the Balance Sheet; (b)
liabilities incurred in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice
since the Balance Sheet Date . . . ; (c) liabilities under this agreement; (d) other
liabilities which individually or in the aggregate do not and could not reasonable be
expected to have a Material Adverse Effect.
Id. at 39-40.
93. Id. at 68.
94. See, e.g., Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 *34
(Del. Ch. April 29, 2005); Hollinger Int'l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1070 (Del. Ch. 2004);
Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-11(111), 2007 WL 4698244 (Tenn. Ch. Dec 27,
2007). Finish Line attempted to cancel its proposed $1.5 billion merger with Genesco in the wake
of the 2007 credit crisis. Although the proposed merger was a strategic combination (as opposed
to a unilateral investment such as an LBO), the case illustrates the recent resurgence of MAC
clause litigation. Unlike many strategic mergers, the deal involved a considerable amount of debt.
See James Covert & Zachery Kouwe, Finish Line May Need Drastic Steps, N.Y. PosT, Jan. 5,
2008, at 21. The Tennessee Chancery Court ultimately ordered the merger to go through,
"conclud[ing] that the combined entity can succeed" in spite of unfavorable economic conditions.
Genesco, 2007 WL 4698244.
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standard, or any analogous standards is uncertain."95 Specifically, Vice
Chancellor Strine included a crucial qualification in his opinion when he
admonished that a target's failure to meet earnings projections would be
more material in the case of an acquiror whose intention was to hold the
target for a short period of time.
To a short-term speculator, the failure of a company to meet analysts'
projected earnings for a quarter could be highly material. Such a fail-
ure is less important to an acquiror who seeks to purchase the com-
pany as part of a long-term strategy. To such an acquiror, the
important thing is whether the company has suffered a Material
Adverse Effect in its business or results of operations that is conse-
quential to the company's earnings power over a commercially rea-
sonable period, which one would think would be measured in years
rather than months. It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would
view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long as the target's
eamings-generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or
the blip's cause.9"
The short-term speculator/strategic acquiror distinction to which Vice
Chancellor Strine refers is somewhat irrelevant in a public merger
whereby two or more corporations seek to achieve synergies and econo-
mies of scale through combining. The investment horizon for these
transactions is long-term and, more often than not, indefinite.
It seems apparent, however, that the short-term speculator/strategic
acquiror distinction should prove critical in the case of a PE transaction
cancelled on MAC grounds. 97 For one thing, the PE business model
requires short-term holding periods of three to six years, after which
time a PE firm relinquishes its ownership of a portfolio company by
initiating a public offering or reselling the shares to another acquiror.98
Moreover, the relationship between PE acquiror and target is substan-
tially more symbiotic than the relationship between strategic acquiror
and target. 99 In a strategic combination, a faltering subsidiary can share
physical, human, and financial capital with its parent after the acquisi-
95. Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal Usage Analysis of "Material Adverse Change" Provisions,
10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 24 (2004).
96. In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 67 (citing Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies Inc.,
No. 98-2441, 1999 WL 1082539, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999)). Pine State Creamery Co. involved
Flav-O-Rich, Inc.'s proposed purchase of the Pine State dairy farm. The asset purchase provision
contained a material adverse change clause. Id. at * 1. Pine State suffered significant economic
losses during a two-month period that spanned a portion of the executory period. Id. at *2. In
remanding the case for trial, the Court held that whether the losses constituted a material adverse
change was a genuine issue of material fact given the fact that the dairy business was cyclical in
nature. Id. at *6.
97. See In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 67.
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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tion has closed. On the other hand, in a PE transaction, a portfolio com-
pany only has access to the PE fund's financial resources.
Since In re IBP, the Delaware Chancery Court has recognized that
the definition of "materiality" ought to hinge on the target's ability to
absorb any extraneous costs imposed upon it by a potential acquiror
within the temporal scope of the acquisition. In Frontier Oil Corp. v.
Holly Corp., two mid-sized petroleum companies agreed to merge. °10
During the executory period, Frontier Oil was joined as a defendant in a
massive toxic tort suit against one of its subsidiaries.' 1 After drawn-out
negotiations to revise the terms of the merger, Frontier filed suit in Dela-
ware alleging repudiation of the contract. 10 2 In response, Holly Corp.
argued that the huge potential litigation costs constituted a breach of the
agreement's material adverse effect clause.10 3 In holding that Holly had
not proven that the potential litigation amounted to a material adverse
effect, the Court reasoned that Frontier could cover its legal costs with-
out a "[significant interference] with the carrying on of ... business" in
the "longer-term." 04
The Frontier Oil decision was issued during an exceptionally bull-
ish economy and it seems reasonable to believe that market conditions
dictated the Court's conclusion that the combined Frontier/Holly entity
would be able to handle the financial burden of a class-action lawsuit.
Moreover, shortly after Frontier took its contractual dispute to Delaware,
Frontier was able to obtain a $120 million insurance policy to cover its
potential tort liability, 0 5 which its insurers predicted "was somewhere
south of $20 million." ' 6 Thus, the exogenous risks that the merger
faced were isolated and insurable. By contrast, in a credit-tightened mar-
ket the threat of loan default for a PE portfolio company becomes less
insurable0 7 and the risk of default more probable than, for example, a
tort suit in the early stages of litigation. The financial exposure for loan
100. No. Civ. A 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
101. Id. at *11.
102. Id. at *24.
103. Id. at *25.
104. Id. at *37.
105. Id. at *25.
106. Id. at *37 n. 231.
107. Bond insurers are notable victims of the credit crisis. Credit-default swaps and other
credit derivatives and credit insurance products have all but crippled the worldwide financial
system. In late 2007, two of the largest American insurers, MBIA and AMBAC, which guarantee
many of the bonds issued on behalf of leveraged investments through credit derivatives, were at
risk of bankruptcy. Additionally, in September of 2008, AIG, which underwrote billions of dollars
of credit-default swaps, was rescued by the Federal Reserve in an $85 billion bailout. See, e.g.,
Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Next on the Worry List: Shaky Insurers of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2008, at AI; Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath,
U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout, WALL ST. J., September 16, 2008, at Al.
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default in deals that are leveraged by as much as $16 billion worth of
debt 0 8 is much more significant than the $20 million potential tort lia-
bility in Frontier Oil. Indeed, at least one group of practitioners has
predicted that after Frontier Oil, a financial acquiror such as a PE firm,
may find it even easier to claim a material adverse change.
[B]uyers of going concerns are best able to prove materiality when
the adverse change is so severe that the target's ability to continue
operations is severely impaired. Note that this reasoning.., suggests
that financial buyers may be in a better position to make MAC claims
than strategic buyers; materiality from the perspective of "a reasona-
ble acquiror" is easier to show when a target is to be resold before
costs can be absorbed. 109
This reasoning further suggests that courts can and should be more sym-
pathetic to acquirors in a "short-term speculator" transaction.
C. Material adverse changes in financing structure: Raskin v.
Birmingham Steel Corp
Unfortunately, no case interpreting a MAC since In re IBP has
teased out the implications of "short-term speculator" distinction to
which Vice Chancellor Strine referred. 110 Moreover, some cases have
expressly declined to interpret broadly drawn MAC clauses as including
declines in future prospects.11' Clearly, the PE business model is predi-
108. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Terry Pristin, Takeover Battle Ends with Sale of Big
Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at Al. The Blackstone acquisition of Equity Properties Trust
has been deemed the biggest LBO in history. It is, therefore, an extreme example. The terms of the
deal are characteristic of the hay-day market of 2006, yet some buyouts continue to be leveraged
in amounts measured in billions. Id.
109. David Sands, Gabriel Matus & Taylor Dasher, The Global Credit Crunch: A MAC?,
THEDEAL.COM, Nov. 14, 2007 (on file with author).
110. C.f; United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810, (Del. Ch. 2007); Hexion
Specialty Chems. Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., No. 3841-VCL, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 134, *53 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 28, 2008. The United Rentals case involved a wholly owned subsidiary of Cerberus
Capital management. RAM Holdings was Cerbems's acquisition vehicle in its planned $7 billion
leveraged buyout of United Rentals. Although the pleadings tangentially referred to whether
United Rentals had suffered a MAC, Chancellor Chandler ultimately decided the case on other
grounds. RAM, 937 A.2d at 844-45, 845 n.202 ("Although some in the media have discussed this
case in the context of Material Adverse Change ("MAC") clauses, the dispute between [United
Rentals] and Cerberus is a good, old fashioned contract case prompted by buyer's remorse...
Indeed, defendants have admitted that they have breached the Merger Agreement and seek no
protection from the Agreement's MAC clause.").
111. See Pacheco v. Cambridge Tech. Partners, Inc. 85 F. Supp. 2d 69, 77 (D. Mass. 2000)
(finding that "a company's internal knowledge of likely difficulties in meeting future earnings
expectations bears on its 'prospects' ...." and does not constitute a material adverse change
where the relevant MAC clause is directed to account for changes in the target's current business
condition); Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Raytheon Co., No. 98 Civ. 2744(LAP), 1999 WL 681382, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,1999) (refusing to interpret a MAC clause that references a company's
"financial condition," "business," or "assets" as encompassing "future prospects").
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cated on future prospects and the ability of portfolio companies to add
value to the PE firms' investment funds. Nonetheless, one particular
case does give insight as to how a court is likely to interpret broadly
drawn MAC clauses where a proposed merger is cancelled on debt
financing grounds.
In Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp.," 2 the Delaware Chancery
Court considered a bank's ability to syndicate a leveraged merger loan
and concluded that a target company had suffered a material adverse
change in its financial position. " 3 There, Birmingham Steel Corporation
suffered a near 50 percent decrease in earnings following the execution
of a merger agreement with a subsidiary of the Harbert Corporation." 4
Harbert's financing partners, Continental Bank, N.A. and Bear Steams
had agreed to finance the deal by syndicating a $100 million bridge loan
and a $350 million senior credit facility." 5 Upon Birmingham's earn-
ings reports, however, Bear Stearns "indicated .. . [that it did not]
believe that the acquisition [was] financeable." 16 In response, all parties
to the transaction agreed to desist from the deal. A class action was
brought on behalf of the Birmingham shareholders who alleged that the
transaction should have gone forward, and the instant opinion addressed
the validity of the settlement agreement.
While the court's decision rested primarily on endogenous changes
in Birmingham's core business," 7 the case could nonetheless prove per-
suasive in any MAC litigation arising out of a cancelled PE deal. First,
the case is an example of a transaction that ultimately proved disadvan-
tageous for both target and acquiror. This fact alone, could direct a
Court's attention to the inherent symbiotic relationship between target
and acquiror in an LBO. Second, the case is notable for grounding its
analysis on the deal's financing requirements. The banks' syndication
concerns presumably centered on the high interest rates that the secon-
dary debt investors would have required had the deal gone through; the
higher the interest, the greater the burden on the company to service its
obligations, and the more probable the chance of default. In the Court's
112. Civ. A. No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990).
113. Id. at *5 ("As to the principal claim-breach of an executory contract to merge-the
record is strong that the financial performance of Birmingham following the execution of the
merger agreement constituted a material adverse change in financial conditions of Birmingham.").
114. Id. at *1, *2. The case refers to the deal as a merger, but the Harbert subsidiary was
merely a shell investment vehicle that offered $30 per share of Birmingham stock. Id. at * 1. Thus,
the deal had the substantive characteristics of an acquisition.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. ("Birmingham attributed the poor earnings performance to a series of unrelated one-
time events.").
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risk analysis, the pendulum therefore swung in favor of discontinuing
the deal.
D. Contextualizing material adverse changes in the private equity
industry: toward a new standard?
The question of whether a global credit crisis should amount to a
material adverse change is a difficult one to address. Commentators
have answered the question in the negative 1 8 and contemporary juris-
prudence would seem to concur. Despite Vice Chancellor Strine's con-
donation of "[a]n approach that reads broad clauses as addressing
fundamental events that would materially affect the value of a target to a
reasonable acquiror,"" 9 courts are inclined to interpret broadly-drafted
MAC clauses as narrowly as possible. 2 ° Nonetheless, the particular
contours of the private equity industry require that courts reevaluate the
approach taken in interpreting MAC clauses. MAC case law is want for
clarity; courts have consistently "chosen not to derive guidelines for the
interpretation of MAC clauses from a probing look at the function of
such clauses,"' 21 but if the recent wave of private equity deal cancella-
tions continues courts may not be able to make that choice.
Vice Chancellor Strine's formulation of a materiality standard cen-
ters on the "reasonable acquiror." While this "theoretical framework...
is to be welcomed," '122 the nature of the PE acquisition model requires
that courts engage in a more comprehensive analysis. A court presented
with a MAC dispute must examine the proposed PE transaction by keep-
ing the symbiotic nature of the relationship between PE acquiror and
target in mind. As detailed above, MAC clauses in today's market are
unlikely to include carve-out for downturns in the secondary debt-mar-
118. See Sands et al., supra note 109 ("Recent market events pose the question of whether a
global credit crunch can trigger a MAC and allow the buyer the option to terminate the
transaction. A review of standard MAC clauses and case law suggests that in most cases it would
not.").
119. In re IBP, 789 A.2d. at 68 n. 155 (emphasis added).
120. Joel I. Greenberg & A. Julia Haddad, The Material Adverse Change Clause, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 23, 2001, at S5 ("The overriding message from an examination of the case law is that parties
should not assume that a broad MAC provision will cover the full range of possible changes to a
business that would render an acquisition unpalatable, because this broad stroke approach is not
the outlook that most courts adopt in construing the clauses."); see also Esplande Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Templeton Energy Income Corp., 889 F.2d 621, 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that a 30
percent decline in the price of oil did not amount to a MAC in a acquisition agreement between
two oil companies that included the clause, "there shall occur no adverse material change to the
[oil properties from the date of this letter] to [the] Closing"); Borders v. KLRB, Inc., 727 S.W.2d
357, 358-59 (Tex. App. 1987) (in an acquisition of a radio station, declining to interpret a fifty-
seven percent drop in Arbitron ratings as a "material adverse change in the business, operations,
properties and other assets" of the station).
121. Galil, supra note 9, at 864.
122. Id. at 853.
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ket. However, because a target company's economic health-arid its
"overall earnings potential" 2 3-is contingent upon its ability to service
the debt that its PE acquiror has leveraged on the target's assets within
the timeframe of the investment, an appropriate legal standard for PE
MAC litigation must be receptive to broad changes in the secondary debt
markets.' 24 Such a standard would be grounded in basic economics.
Rather than starting from the vantage point of the reasonable acquiror,
courts would be better suited to determine if the deal makes sense as an
overall "reasonable private equity transaction."
Quite simply, courts must understand that if a portfolio company
cannot service its debt in the period following a buyout neither it, nor its
PE parent, will survive. Thus, a workable standard might employ a sim-
ple discounted cash flow analysis and present a single evidentiary ques-
tion: given the debt financing requirements of a leveraged buyout, has
the party alleging a MAC presented enough evidence to demonstrate that
the target company would become insolvent post-closing if obligated to
service the debt used to finance the acquisition? If the answer is yes,
then a MAC will have occurred. If not, then the court would favor spe-
cific performance. Such a standard serves the best interests of acquirors
and targets while promoting the maintenance of shareholder value in
transactions. 1
25
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to address the concerns raised by the
wave of leveraged buyouts that were cancelled in late 2007. On the heels
of a global credit crisis, nearly $45 billion'26 worth of private-equity
sponsored transactions were renegotiated or abandoned altogether. Many
PE firms sought repudiation via material adverse change clauses, which
are common to merger and acquisition agreements. Although a MAC
may offer respite to jilted parties, the jurisprudence governing the inter-
pretation of these clauses is dreadfully limited in its application. The
current materiality standard is set forth in a case that involved a merger
of two strategically positioned entities that sought economies of scale
123. In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 68.
124. At least one court has recognized that a materiality standard must be fashioned to meet the
particular needs of the transaction at hand. N. Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d. 456,
463 (lst Cir. 1988) ("'Materiality,' we think, is not what a disappointed party says it is; rather, it
demands an objective cross-matching of the significance of a fact to the essence of the transaction
in question, and requires a plausible showing of the potentially adverse effect of the former on the
latter.").
125. See cases cited supra note 59.
126. Craig, supra note 2.
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through their proposed combination. 127 Private equity transactions, how-
ever, differ greatly from strategic mergers, and therefore warrant a dif-
ferent jurisprudential approach. Whether a court chooses to tease out
Vice Chancellor Strine's short-term speculator/strategic acquiror distinc-
tion or adopt a wholly novel legal analysis, courts must be receptive to
the impact that changes in the overall secondary debt market'28 can have
on a deal's practicability.
At first blush, the most obvious solution to MAC litigation would
seem to be a narrowly drafted clause with a far-reaching set of carve-
outs. This Comment has sought to demonstrate why such a clause is
financially dangerous in the context of a private equity sponsored acqui-
sition. PE acquirors place enormous financial burdens on their portfolio
companies by concurrently requiring them to service acquisition debt
and generate operational returns. Those burdens grow as interest rates
increase; the more capital that is required to service the acquisition debt,
the more capital that must be diverted from the business's operations.
Ultimately, a portfolio company's financial livelihood is contingent
upon its PE parent's ability to secure favorable financing. Conversely,
the PE fund is dependant upon the portfolio company's ability to con-
tribute value to the fund upon the resale of the company. A broadly
drafted MAC clause, or a broad judicial interpretation thereof, is an
invaluable tool for those parties seeking to account for this bifurcated
risk.
In 1989 Professor Michael C. Jensen famously predicted the
"eclipse of the ... public corporation." 2 9 The leveraged buyout revolu-
tion had just begun. Since the late 1980s the private equity industry has
generated astonishing returns for its investors by acquiring distressed
companies, eliminating excess operational costs and returning the com-
panies to public shareholders or selling the companies assets to other PE
funds. The PE business model, however, is not without its substantial
risks. Distressed target companies are at the mercy of acquirors. If courts
cannot account for the symbiotic nature of the private equity business
model by broadly characterizing material adverse change clauses in
unfavorable debt markets, then private equity may yet be witness to its
very own eclipse.
127. See In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 21.
128. For an analysis of the secondary debt market and its impact on the broader economy in
the wake of the credit crisis, see Vikas Bajaj, U.S. Tries a Trillion-Dollar Key for Locked Lending,
N. Y. TtMEs, Feb. 20, 2009, at Al.
129. Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61, 74.
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